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1 Introduction
Hundreds of studies have demonstrated that higher education is associated
with higher income. The estimates of the private rate of return to investments
in education vary across countries and over time but are usually between 5
and 15 percent. (See e.g. Ashenfelter, Harmon & Oosterbeek, 1999; Card,
2001).
Much less is known about the risks associated with investments in human
capital. Education can be considered as a risky investment because the vari-
ance of earnings is generally increasing in the level of education. On the
other hand, the unemployment rate is inversely correlated with the level of
education indicating that education is also an insurance against uncertain
job prospects.
The risks involved in human capital investments can be measured at various
frequencies. Education may affect both the transitory and the permanent
component of earnings. In this paper we argue that since education is a
long-term investment, a natural measure of risk is the variability of lifetime
income.
We therefore estimate means, variances and skews of lifetime incomes con-
ditional on education based on Finnish 22-year panel data. According to
our estimates, university education is associated with higher mean, higher
variance and higher skew in lifetime earnings. If individuals are risk averse,
a higher variance reduces the value of education. However, commonly used
utility functions also imply that for the same level of variance, higher skew
increases the value of education. There empirical evidence supporting both
variance aversion and skew affection (e.g. Golec & Tamarkin, 1998; Garrett
& Sobel, 1999; Hartog, 2011). In the calculations presented in this paper we
assume that utility funtion displays constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
and find that the risk-adjusted returns are comparable to unadjusted ones.
According to our estimates, certainty equivalent labor income roughly dou-
bles between vocational high school and university whether adjusting for risk
or not. Disposable income increases by roughly two thirds to three quarters.
Our paper is related to multiple strands of literature. A number of papers
starting with King (1974) and reviewed in Hartog (2011) estimate risk com-
pensating earnings differentials between fields of education or occupations
by including the variance and the skew of earnings in a log earnings regres-
sion. Risk averse individuals should demand higher wages if the variance of
earnings in their occupation is high and accept lower wages in occupations
where earnings have higher skew. In this literature, the risk measures are
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usually based on the residual variance of annual earnings after controlling for
schooling and age or experience. Some related papers measure the effect of
ducation on the distribution on earnings using quantile regression (Pereira
Martins, 2002) or model the effect of education using a random coefficient
model (Harmon et al., 2003).
More recently, there have been efforts to disentangle unobserved heterogene-
ity from uncertainty in residual earnings. Chen (2008) decomposes the resid-
ual variance of earnings into unobserved heterogeneity and uncertainty or
risk. According to her model, observed variance in earnings on one hand un-
derestimates the effects of education on inequality because of selection into
schooling. On the other hand, not all inequality is risk, as individuals may
have private information on their future wages. Risk may thus be either
higher or lower than observed inequality. Chen finds that risk is increasing
between some levels of education but decreasing between others.
Mazza, van Ophem & Hartog (2011) try to replicate Chen’s methods using
the same data, but find risk profiles that rise much more strongly in educa-
tion. More importantly, they find that selection into schooling increases
rather than decreases observed inequality. The same method applied to
British data shows risk decreasing in education, while German data do not
fit the model at all, and cannot be estimated. Cunha & Heckman (2007) sur-
vey a body of work by Heckman with various coauthors on uncertainty and
heterogeneity in the returns to education. The authors find that over 50%
of ex post variance is forecastable by individuals. The findings of Heckman
and others stand in contrast with surveys indicating that students do poorly
when asked to predict their own position in the future wage distribution
within their level and field of education (Hartog 2011).
We conclude from the literature that whether unobserved heterogeneity can
be separated from risk is still subject to considerable controversy. Observed
residual variance can either over- or underestimate risk. In this paper, we do
not attempt to identify private risks or identify the causal effects of education
on the variance of lifetime earnings, but rather conduct a more descriptive
analysis on the relationship between education and variability of lifetime in-
come. Our possibilities to address selectivity issues in this paper are limited.
However, for a subsample used in the analysis we can control for the cogni-
tive test scores and parents’ level of education. These controls shrink income
difference between university and vocational high school graduates by 22%
of the original difference. The reduction of certainly equivalent gains from
education shrink with a similar proportion after adding these controls.
Most papers on risk in returns to education as well as papers on income
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dynamics use relatively short panels to decompose residual earnings variance
into permanent and transitory parts. Among the exceptions are Bjo¨rklund
(1993) and Bo¨nke, Corneo & Lu¨then (2012), who compare distributions of
annual and lifetime incomes. Bhuller, Mogstad & Salvanes (2011) measure
the effects of earnings on directly observed lifetime earnings. Consistent with
predictions by Haider & Solon (2006) they find that estimates of the return
to education are sensitive to the age structure of the sample.
Our approach is most closely related to a recent working paper by Brown,
Fang & Gomes (2012). There the authors analyze certainly equivalent gains
from education accounting for risk preferences, earnings volatility and pro-
gressive taxation. They find that high school education is associated with
higher lifetime earnings, reduced earnings volatility and lower risk of unem-
ployment compared to less than high school. They also find that college
graduates have higher lifetime earnings than high school graduates but col-
lege education is also associated with higher earnings volatility, reducing the
value of education. Accounting for progressive taxation, unemployment in-
surance and social security further reduces the value of education.
While our basic approach is similar to that of Brown, Fang & Gomes, there
are also some important differences. Brown, Fang & Gomes apply a standard
time separable utility function to calculate expected lifetime utility. By con-
trast, we calculate the expected utility of discounted lifetime income. Hence
we measure the risk related to human capital investments as the variation
in lifetime earnings rather than period-specific volatility. Our approach also
makes it easier to account for years with zero income, especially while in
school and during other non-employment periods.
We add to the literature in a number of ways. First, we calculate the effect of
education on the variance of income in a lifetime perspective where previous
papers have typically used considerably shorter observation periods. Second,
in addition to the variance, we also account for the skew in the earnings dis-
tribution, separating the upside risk from downside risks. Since our method is
largely nonparametric, we do not have to log income measurements, and can
therefore unproblematically include zeros in the calculations of of all three
moments. Third, we account for employment risk and social insurance. Our
approach makes it easy to deal with issues such as duration of education and
retirement age as these can be directly observed from the data.
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2 Data
We use the person file form the Finnish Linked Employee–Employer Data set
(FLEED) compiled by Statistics Finland. It consists of a one third random
sample of individuals residing in Finland at some point between 1988 and
2009. Individuals are present in the data for each year that they are registered
in the Finnish population register, and individual information can be linked
across years using person identifiers.
The key variables in the data contain information on the highest degree
completed, on taxable earnings and on taxes paid. As most transfers are
taxable in Finland they are also included in the data. All information is
based on administrative registers. Educational attainment data are based
on reports by schools to Statistics Finland and contains information on the
date and type of degree according to the Finnish Standard Classification of
Education. Information on earnings, taxes and transfers are based on tax
records.
We restrict the sample to individuals aged 16–64 at the end of the calendar
year. We define the level of schooling as the highest level of schooling achieved
at age 30, and we therefore also have to exclude individuals who never turn
30 within the sample period. Furthermore, since we can only observe the
date and level of the highest degree in the years between 1988 and 2009,
we also have to exclude those who have received their highest degree after
turning 30 but before entering the observation window because we do not
know their highest degree at age 30. We focus on individuals with either
compulsory education, vocational high school or a university degree as their
highest level of education because these groups are comparably large, and the
content of their degrees is consistent over time. We also discard immigrants
by excluding persons who were citizens of a foreign country in any of the
years that we have data on. The number of observations retained at each
stage can be seen from Table 1. In total, we retain data 996471 individuals
with on average about 17 yearly observations per individual.
Table 1: Sample selection.
individuals observations
between 16 and 64 1559554 22312681
excluding immigrants 1500141 21875181
schooling known 996471 16849188
Notes: the number of observations refers to the total number of yearly observations. The average
number of years of data per individual in the final sample is thus about 17.
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The age structure of the sample changes over time, and we need to make
monetary variables comparable across time. To do this, we deflate all mone-
tary variables to the 2009 level using the cost of living index from Statistics
Finland. Since the cost of living was lower in earlier years, this effectively
means inflating the earlier observations. On top of that, we account for real
earnings growth by deflating with an additional 2% per year, a figure that
comes close to average real earnings growth both over the sample period and
over longer time frames. In this way, we keep business cycle variation in
the data while removing the average trend. Once observations have been
made comparable across individuals, we add back 2% earnings growth to the
moments of discounted lifetime income estimated below.
In this paper, we focus on labor income, which is reported directly in the data.
All monetary variables in FLEED are top-coded at a nominal level of EUR
200 000 throughout the years. Because censoring affects less than 0.000522 of
yearly observations, the effect of censoring on mean lifetime earned income is
negligible. However, the higher moments are more sensitive to censoring. We
alleviate this problem using data on taxes. Because tax information is cen-
sored at the same nominal level as income variables, we can impute incomes
for the observations that have censored incomes but uncensored tax variables
using average municipal tax rates and taxes paid. Imputation of high incomes
below the censoring threshold show that this method is accurate. Less than
0.000014 of observations have censored municipal tax amounts, and for these
we use the imputed amount at the municipal tax censoring threshold.
While municipal and church taxes are reported consistently in the data, state
taxes are included only in some years. To ensure that tax treatment is com-
parable across years, we impute state taxes for all years by applying each
year’s tax schedule to that year’s taxable earnings for all years. A compar-
ison with the years for which state tax information is available shows that
actual tax amounts are very close to those predicted by the tax schedule.
Table 2: Proportion of observations censored
before imputation after imputation
Taxable income 0.000521 0.000013
Labor income 0.000353 0.000011
We compare both lifetime earnings and lifetime disposable earnings across
levels of education. We also separate earnings risks from employment risks by
examining separately the subsample of individuals that are either employed
or in school. An individual is included in this subsample when he or she is
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either registered as a student during the last week of the year, or is registered
as employed during the last week, has not been unemployed for more than
two weeks during the year, and whose annual real labor income has exceeded
EUR 5000.
3 Schooling and Incomes in Finland
Finnish children start school at age 7. All children attend comprehensive
school for nine years. At the age sixteen the students make first important
choices regarding their education. Currently, about 45% of students continue
to vocational secondary education that typically also takes three years to
complete. After vocational school it is possible to continue at polytechnics
or universities of applied sciences but for many, vocational school is their
final education level.
The other 55% of students enter three year general secondary programmes
ending in a matriculation exam which provides eligibility for tertiary educa-
tion. In contrast to many other countries, university students are accepted
directly to programs leading to a Master’s level degree. University admission
is competitive with less than half of applicants being admitted. Universities
do not charge tuition fees and students receive relatively generous student
grants.
Dropping out is common at all levels. Currently about 15% of thirty-year-olds
have no education after compulsory school. In most cases these individuals
have started in vocational education but never finished it. Dropping out of
university is also common. In the data these persons are usually coded as
having a general secondary education degree as the highest education level.
While the Master’s level university education and secondary vocational ed-
ucation have remained reasonably similar over a long time, the structure of
education has changed much more at other levels. For example, universities
awarded Bachelor degrees in short university programs during the 1970s. In
the 80s, thesse disappeared but in 90s they were re-created as vocational-
oriented tertiary education at polytechnics. All these are coded as lower ter-
tiary education degrees in the Standard classification of education but large
changes in content make comparing cohorts born widely apart very difficult.
In this study we concentrate on comparisons between those with no post-
compulsory education to those with vocational upper secondary education
on the one hand and vocational upper secondary graduates to holders of
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Master’s degrees on the other. These education levels are consistently coded
across cohorts, and jointly make up a large share of individuals in each cohort.
As a first glance into the relationship between schooling and long-term income
differences we plot the average annual incomes by the level of schooling in
figures 1 and 2. In the figures we use data from the cohorts born between
1955 and 1964. For each individual in these cohorts we have calculated 22-
year average income using data from the years from 1988 to 2009, and we
display the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles of these long-term
average incomes. The figures also illustrate the size of the groups; the height
of each box is proportional to the number of individuals at each education
level.
As can be seen from the figures, compulsory education and vocational high
school are the two largest education categories. With respect to earnings the
Master’s degree holders earn substantially more than vocational high school
graduates, but vocational high school graduates do not make much more
than those with compulsory school only. The figures also illustrate that the
variance and the skew of long-term earnings are markedly larger for university
graduates.
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Figure 1: 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles of 22-year averages of
annual labor incomes by education, men. Data cover cohorts born between
1955 and 1964. Earnings are observed from 1988 to 2009. The horizontal
axis is in thousands of 2009 EUR. Dots indicate means. The heights of the
boxes are proportionate to the number of individuals in the sample, which
also have been added within parentheses on the right hand side of the figure.
Boxes in grey indicate levels of education not used in the analysis.
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Figure 2: 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentiles of 22-year averages of
annual labor incomes by education, women. See Figure 1 for details.
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4 Methods
The relationship between education, age and mean earnings can be estimated
based on a cross-section from a single year, and thus place relatively low re-
quirements on the data. Calculating the variance of lifetime earnings is more
demanding as it not only requires information about the variance of earnings
at each age, but also about the covariance of earnings between different ages.
Data sets spanning entire lifetimes are rare, but there are several data sets
that span one or more decades. We demonstrate that such data can still
be used to nonparametrically estimate the distribution of lifetime earnings
in a straightforward manner. We do this in a way that accounts for the
risk of having no earnings and does not impose strong assumptions on the
shape of age-earnings profile, length of schooling or working life, nor on the
relationship between age and variance of earnings.
We make two simplifying assumptions: that cohort effects can be ignored
and that time effects can be accounted for by simple trends as described in
the data section. Under these assumption the mean lifetime income for any
exogeneously defined group can be nonparametrically estimated from cross-
section or pooled panel data. Mean discounted lifetime income µ is simply
the sum of the mean incomes wt at each age t, discounted at rate r.
µ = E(Y ) =
64∑
t=16
w¯t
(1 + r)t−16
In a similar way the variance of discounted lifetime income is the sum of
the discounted elements of the variance covariance matrix describing the
covariances cov of earnings between ages t and j.
E[(Y − µ)2] =
64∑
t=16
64∑
j=16
cov(wt, wj)
(1 + r)t−16(1 + r)j−16
For all the cells of the covariance matrix to be known, we would need a
panel spanning over the length of working life, but in that case we could
calculate the variance of lifetime incomes directly. For shorter panels, only
part of the covariance matrix will be observed. In general, when estimating
a covariance matrix ranging over A age groups with a panel of length N ,
(A−N + 1)(A−N) elements of the matrix will be unobserved. Since in our
case A = 49 and N = 22, about 69% of the elements of the covariance matrix
can be directly estimated. Fortunately these are also elements that make
the largest contribution to the variance of lifetime earnings. The unobserved
10
elements are small because the covarinces of earnings is the smaller the further
away they are from the diagonal of the covariance matrix. Furthermore,
discounting reduces the weight of missing elements.
We thus estimate nonparametrically covariances between residual incomes
at age t and age t + 1 through t + N − 1, where N is the length of our
panel. For the remaining correlations with residual income at higher ages,
we impute it with the last covariance element that we could estimate, i.e.
with the covariance of income at ages t and t+N −1. Under the assumption
that covariances decrease monotonically from that point on, this will provide
us with an upper bound of the missing covariances. As a robustness check, we
repeat our analysis with imputed zeroes and with predictions from an AR(1)
model instead. Because even at the upper bound only a small proportion of
the total covariance is contained in the missing cells, these adjustments do
not make a large difference in the results.
This method is easily extensible to higher moments, though the proportion
of missing cells increases each time. For example, the skew of lifetime income
is given by the sum of the discounted elements of the skew coskew tensor.
E[(Y − µ)3] =
64∑
t=16
64∑
j=16
64∑
k=16
coskew(wt, wj, wk)
(1 + r)t−16(1 + r)j−16
Because coskews drop off quickly away from the main diagonal, we make no
attempts at imputing missing coskews, but simply set them to zero. This
part of the analysis is also computationally intensive, since the skew coskew
tensor has 493 cells for a working life of 49 years.
After having obtained the mean, variance and skew of lifetime income, we
can enter them into an arbitrary utility function U in order to compress them
into a single figure. We use the constant relative risk aversion family of utility
functions, which is given by
1
1− ρY
1−ρ, ρ 6= 1
ln(Y ), ρ = 1.
where Y is lifetime income, and ρ the coefficient of risk aversion. Because we
cannot observe the actual distribution of lifetime incomes, but have estimates
of its moments, we follow Hartog (2011), and instead use a third order Taylor
approximation of the utility function, into which we can substitute the first
three moments of lifetime income.
U(Y ) ≈ U(µ) + 1
2
(Y − µ)2U ′′(µ) + 1
6
(Y − µ)3U ′′′(µ)
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With utility levels in hand, we can compute the certainty equivalent level
of lifetime income (CE), which is the certain level of lifetime income which
would yield the same expected utility as a risky draw from the estimated
distribution of lifetime incomes.
Y CE = U−1[E(U [Y ])]
Instead of calculating certainty equivalent values at a fixed discount rate, it
is also possible to calculate the discount rate at which the net present values
for two levels of education are equal. This discount rate is closely related
to commonly used internal rates of return or IRRs, but here defined over
utilities instead of earnings so that it also accounts for risk.
E[U(Y [r])]s=1 = E[U(Y [r])]s=0
Rates of return need not be unique, and so we perform a numerical search
for the lowest positive discount rate just below which the higher level of
education has the higher expected lifetime utility, and just above which the
lower level of education has the higher expected lifetime utility. While none
of the cases shown below have infinite rates of return, there are cases in which
the lower level of education gives a higher expected lifetime utility level for
any positive discount rate. When internal rates of return are very high, they
effectively only take income at young ages into account. We therefore prefer
to use CEs in our main analysis, and report only a subset of results as IRRs.
Conclusions based on IRRs are however qualitatively similar.
We calculate the moments of lifetime income separately for men and women
for three levels of education (compulsory, vocational high school, university).
We also present separate estimates for labor income and disposable income
and separate estimates for the employed only. We then calculate CEs for
with different levels of risk aversion using both a second and a third order
Taylor approximation. Finally, for the sake of comparison, we calculate IRRs
for a subset of these combinations as well as a set of OLS estimates return
to education based on Mincer equations.
4.1 Calculating standard errors
Calculating standard errors analytically for complicated nonlinear functions
of experssions involving for example a 49×49×49 skew coskew tensor is diffi-
cult. Bootstrapping would provide a simple solution but calculating hundreds
of thousends of coskews on millions of observations would require much more
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computing power than what we have available, and hence is not a realistic
option for us.
Instead, we follow Politis, Romano & Wolf (1999), and repeatedly draw (with-
out replacement) 200 subsamples with 10 000 individuals in each subsample
from each education×gender group of our original sample. We calculate all
of our statistics from each draw. The standard deviation of the estimates
from these 200 replications provides us a conservative estimate of standard
error in the original sample. Assuming that our estimates converge at a rate
of τn = n
−0.5 we can then multiply the standard errors obtained from the
subsample standard deviations by b0.5 · n−0.5, where b is the subsample size
and n is the sample size for each education×gender group in the main sample.
Tables with undeflated standard errors can be found in the appendix.
We also report standard errors for the differences in certainty equivalents
between levels of education. Since these estimates of the certainty equivalents
are independent by construction, these standard errors are simply given by√
ˆse2h +
ˆse2l ,
where ˆse2h and
ˆse2l are the estimated standard errors of the certainty equiva-
lent lifetime incomes of the higher and lower level of education respectively.
5 Results
5.1 Moments and certainty equivalent income
In Figure 3 we plot our estimated age-earnings profiles. These earnings are
discounted to 2009 price and real wage levels, but are otherwise simple arith-
metic averages of earnings by age and education. Note that zero-earnings
observations have been retained in the data used for calculating these aver-
ages.
From the figures we can confirm the conclusion from earlier Figures 1 and
2 that the university educated earn substantially more than those at the
two other education levels, but that the differences between workers with
vocational and workers with only compulsory education are not very large.
Income for compulsory school graduates is initially slightly higher than for
vocational school graduates, but that vocational school graduate incomes
quickly overtake compulsory school graduate incomes. University graduates
catch up with vocational school graduates after a few more years.
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Figure 3 also shows that income is substantially higher than zero at ages when
most individuals are still at school. This suggests that forgone earnings while
at school do not seem to be very large, making education look less costly.
After graduation the earnings of university graduates incresae rapidly. The
growth of earnings among university graduates is much faster in both absolute
and relative terms than at lower levels of education. The downward sloping
part of the curves indicates early retirement, and the low levels of earnings
at age 64 illustrate that we are not missing all too much labor income by
ending the observation period to age 64.
Figure 4 shows the estimated covariances of labor income between difference
ages for university educated men. On the diagonal we find the variances for
labor income at each age. The variance is the highest at high ages when some
men are retired while others still have high labor incomes. The volume under
the lines represents the (undiscounted) variance of lifetime income. As can
be seen from the figure, the missing covariances are only a small proportion
of the total variance of lifetime income.
The coskews with age 40 labor income of university educated men have been
plotted in Figure 5. Again, these are based on 2009 wage and price levels, and
are thus not taking into account either discounting or real wage growth. The
shown plane is one of 49 possible cross-sections of the skew coskew tensor.
As can be seen from the figure, the coskews drop off quickly. We therefore
feel confident in imputing the missing coskews with zeroes.
Table 9 shows the estimated moments of lifetime income. Looking at the
results for the entire sample in the top two panels of the table, we see again
that mean lifetime income is much higher for university graduates than for
the other two categories. The coefficient of variation follows a U-shaped
pattern, being lowest for vocational high school graduates. The skews are
clearly higher for the university educated than for the other categories. The
moments of lifetime income are predictably smaller after taxes and transfers.
Finally, all moments are smaller for women than for men, but overall patters
are similar across genders.
In the bottom two panels, we see the same measures calculated on a sample
only including observations where the individual is either in school or working
full time. Compared to the full sample, the coefficient of variation of lifetime
income decreases and the relative skew increases quite substantially for the
lowest two levels of education. More strikingly, compulsory school graduates
have higher mean discounted lifetime incomes than those graduated from
vocational high school once we condition on employment.
In Table 10, we combine the moments of lifetime income in different ways to
14
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Figure 3: Cross-sectional labor income profiles in ’000 EUR for university
education (solid line), vocational high school (dashed line) and compulsory
education only (dotted line): men (top panel) and women (bottom panel).
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Figure 4: Covariances of residual labor income for university educated men.
The volume under the lines represents the variance of lifetime income.
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Figure 5: Coskews of residual labor income for university educated men.
Shown is the cross-section of the skew coskew tensor at age 40. The joint
volumes under the plots of the 49 possible cross-sections represent the skew
of lifetime income.
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arrive at certainty equivalent lifetime incomes. When assuming a coefficient
of relative risk aversion ρ equal to 0, we are effectively calculating mean
discounted lifetime income. When increasing the coefficient of relative risk
aversion, the variances and skews of lifetime income gain in weight. As we saw
before, university education is associated with substantially higher lifetime
income than vocational high school. The difference is about one million euros
for male labor income and about 700 thousand euros for female labor income.
After taxes and transfers, these numbers are somewhat smaller, but still
sizable at roughly 600 thousand euros and 400 thousand euros respectively.
One might think that the differences in mean lifetime incomes between uni-
versity and vocational high school graduates are in fact compensating differ-
entials for the higher variability of lifetime income for university graduates.
After all, the coefficient of variation of lifetime income is higher for university
graduates than for vocational high school graduates. However, when we look
at the differences in CEs for higher levels of risk aversion, we see that they
remain largely unchanged. This is because while variance enters the utility
function negatively, skew enters it positively.
We have also calculated CEs based on means and variances only using a
second order Taylor approximation of the utility function. These estimates
can be found in Table 11. When we omit the skew, the differences between
university and vocational high school graduates are indeed lower at higher
levels of risk aversion, though still substantial. This illustrates how important
it is to control for both variance and skew when evaluating risk. The higher
variance for university graduates reflects a larger proportion of individuals
with very high incomes but not a higher proportion of individuals with very
low incomes. This higher variability is thus not detrimental to expected
utility.
When we turn to the differences in CEs between compulsory and vocational
high school graduates, we see differences in CEs that increase in the coefficient
of relative risk aversion. This is an indication of the more attractive risk
profiles that vocational high school graduates have. The differences in CEs
conditional on employment turn negative. This suggests that the higher CEs
for vocational high school graduates is due to differential employment. An
interesting observation is that while taxes and transfers are a net working
life loss for most individuals, the mean disposable lifetime income of women
with compulsory education is higher than their mean lifetime labor income.
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Table 3: Moments of discounted lifetime income.
men, entire sample
Compulsory Vocational HS University
mean CV skew mean CV skew mean CV skew
labor income 798 0.55 0.50 886 0.46 0.52 1914 0.52 2.59
2 0.00 0.05 2 0.00 0.11 8 0.01 0.18
disposable income 714 0.33 0.55 756 0.29 0.44 1311 0.39 2.48
1 0.00 0.07 1 0.00 0.12 4 0.00 0.16
women, entire sample
Compulsory Vocational HS University
mean CV skew mean CV skew mean CV skew
labor income 586 0.53 0.24 637 0.42 0.14 1327 0.45 1.61
1 0.00 0.03 2 0.00 0.02 6 0.00 0.19
disposable income 598 0.28 0.24 614 0.24 0.15 1005 0.31 1.59
1 0.00 0.02 1 0.00 0.02 3 0.00 0.17
men, employed or in school
Compulsory Vocational HS University
mean CV skew mean CV skew mean CV skew
labor income 1205 0.29 1.68 1193 0.28 1.53 2120 0.47 2.78
2 0.00 0.18 4 0.00 0.26 9 0.01 0.18
disposable income 878 0.23 1.60 884 0.22 1.06 1383 0.37 2.66
1 0.00 0.21 2 0.00 0.25 5 0.00 0.16
women, employed or in school
Compulsory Vocational HS University
mean CV skew mean CV skew mean CV skew
labor income 934 0.24 1.05 893 0.22 0.86 1511 0.39 2.08
1 0.00 0.12 2 0.00 0.07 7 0.01 0.20
disposable income 738 0.19 0.62 718 0.17 0.45 1076 0.29 2.12
1 0.00 0.05 1 0.00 0.04 4 0.00 0.20
Notes: Means are in ’000 EUR. The coefficient of variation CV is defined as the standard deviation
divided by the mean. The measure of skew reported is the third moment about the mean divided by
the third power of the standard deviation.
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Table 4: Certainty equivalent lifetime income, third order Taylor approxima-
tion.
men, entire sample
Compulsory Vocational HS University
relative risk aversion ρ 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
labor income 798 705 654 886 811 764 1914 1889 2121
2 2 4 2 3 6 8 14 37
difference 88 106 110 1029 1078 1357
3 4 7 9 14 37
disposable income 714 680 655 756 727 704 1311 1276 1305
1 1 1 1 1 2 4 5 9
difference 42 47 49 555 549 601
2 2 2 4 5 9
women, entire sample
Compulsory Vocational HS University
relative risk aversion ρ 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
labor income 586 515 471 637 586 547 1327 1260 1258
1 2 2 2 2 2 6 7 14
difference 51 70 76 690 674 711
2 2 3 6 7 14
disposable income 598 576 557 614 596 581 1005 973 958
1 1 1 1 1 1 3 3 4
difference 15 21 25 391 376 377
1 1 1 3 3 4
men, employed or in school
Compulsory Vocational HS University
relative risk aversion ρ 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
labor income 1205 1170 1154 1193 1160 1142 2120 2092 2285
2 2 4 4 3 5 9 13 31
difference -12 -10 -12 927 932 1143
4 4 7 10 13 32
disposable income 878 860 849 884 866 853 1383 1351 1382
1 1 2 2 2 2 5 5 9
difference 6 6 4 499 485 529
2 2 3 5 6 9
women, employed or in school
Compulsory Vocational HS University
relative risk aversion ρ 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
labor income 934 913 896 893 875 860 1511 1459 1469
1 2 2 2 2 2 7 7 12
difference -41 -38 -36 618 584 609
2 2 3 7 7 12
disposable income 738 726 716 718 709 700 1076 1050 1042
1 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 5
difference -20 -18 -16 358 341 342
1 1 2 4 4 5
Notes: Values in ’000 EUR, discounted to age 16 at δ = 0.03. Utility is CRRA(ρ). Standard errors in
italics.
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Table 5: Certainty equivalent lifetime income, second order Taylor approxi-
mation.
men, entire sample
Compulsory Vocational HS University
relative risk aversion ρ 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
labor income 798 685 612 886 798 733 1914 1669 1503
2 2 2 2 2 2 8 7 8
difference 88 112 121 1029 872 770
3 3 3 9 7 8
disposable income 714 676 643 756 725 697 1311 1215 1138
1 1 1 1 1 1 4 3 4
difference 42 49 54 555 490 441
2 2 2 4 4 4
women, entire sample
Compulsory Vocational HS University
relative risk aversion ρ 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
labor income 586 509 457 637 584 542 1327 1199 1102
1 2 2 2 2 2 6 5 5
difference 51 74 85 690 615 560
2 2 2 6 5 5
disposable income 598 575 554 614 596 580 1005 957 916
1 1 1 1 1 1 3 2 2
difference 15 21 26 391 361 336
1 1 1 3 3 3
men, employed or in school
Compulsory Vocational HS University
relative risk aversion ρ 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
labor income 1205 1154 1109 1193 1147 1107 2120 1895 1731
2 2 2 4 3 3 9 7 8
difference -12 -6 -2 927 747 624
4 4 4 10 8 8
disposable income 878 855 833 884 863 844 1383 1291 1215
1 1 1 2 2 2 5 4 4
difference 6 9 11 499 427 371
2 2 2 5 4 4
women, employed or in school
Compulsory Vocational HS University
relative risk aversion ρ 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
labor income 934 908 885 893 872 853 1511 1399 1309
1 1 2 2 2 2 7 5 5
difference -41 -36 -32 618 527 456
2 2 2 7 6 5
disposable income 738 725 713 718 708 699 1076 1032 993
1 1 1 1 1 1 4 3 3
difference -20 -17 -15 358 324 295
1 1 2 4 3 3
Notes: Values in ’000 EUR, discounted to age 16 at δ = 0.03. Utility is CRRA(ρ). Standard errors in
italics.
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5.2 Internal rates of return
In Table 6 we show a subset of the same results expressed in internal rates of
return instead of in certainty equivalent income. Just as in the comparison of
certainty equivalent income, we see that education is associated with a high
internal rate of return for university. The returns to vocational education are
now about as high as those to university (except for women when looking
at disposable income) because at discount rates this high, incomes at higher
ages are effectively ignored and the income differences between vocational
education and compulsory education are more marked at younger ages
We also see again that the return associated with vocational high school is due
to differential employment. Except when looking at the disposable income
of men, there is no positive discount rate below which vocational high school
yields higher discounted lifetime income once we condition on employment.
We omit rates of return based on other levels of the coefficient of relative risk
aversion, but qualitative conclusions are the same as those drawn from the
comparison of certainty equivalent income.
Table 6: Internal rates of return
men Vocational HS University
all employed all employed
labor income 0.25 N/A 0.20 0.15
disposable income 0.18 0.04 0.19 0.15
women Vocational HS University
all employed all employed
labor income 0.21 N/A 0.24 0.16
disposable income 0.09 N/A 0.19 0.15
Notes: Based on CRRA(0) utility. Vocational high school is relative to compulsory education only.
University is relative to vocational high school. N/A indicates that there is no positive discount rate
at which the net present values are equal, yet below which the higher level of education has the higher
net present value.
The IRRs we find for university education are large compared to Mincer
rates of return typically found for Finland. These differences exist for a
number of reasons. First, comparing vocational high school to university
gives a higher return than comparing all levels of education simultaneously.
Second, Mincer rates of return are based on the incomes of the employed
only, while we use all individuals in our baseline specification. Third, the
Mincer specification assumes either infinite working lives, or working lives of
equal length for different levels of education. We use actual labor market
participation. Fourth, the Mincer specification assumes schooling of a fixed
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length, with zero income while in school. We use actual incomes and actual
education durations.
In Table 7 we have tried to bridge the gap between Mincer estimates and
our IRRs to show that they are consistent, and to see how important various
assumptions are. The first row shows the result of a fairly standard Mincer
specification regressing log labor income of full time employed individuals
with ten years of predicted experience on predicted years of schooling. At
0.08 for men and 0.06 for women, the estimates are comparable to what
others have found before us.
In the second row we compare log labor income of university graduates and
vocational high school graduates only. This increases the rate of return to
0.10 and 0.09 respectively. The return increases further to 0.13 and 0.14 re-
spectively when we drop the full time employment restriction and replace all
incomes under EUR 5000 with EUR 5000. This reflects the higher employ-
ment levels of university graduates.
In the fourth and fifth row we calculate IRRs based on the moments of
lifetime income while setting income during predicted years in school as well
as more than 40 years after predicted graduation to zero. The fifth row
includes adjustments for real wage growth. The estimated rates of return in
the fourth row are close to that of the Mincer estimate in the third. The 2%
real wage growth added in the fifth row naturally adds 2% to the IRR.
In the sixth row we drop the restriction of identical working life lengths
and include earnings more than 40 years after predicted graduation. The
difference is negligible because earnings later in life are discounted heavily
under high rates of return.
The seventh row shows our baseline IRR which also includes income earned
during predicted years in school. Since early earnings are weighted heavily
at this high rates of return, this further increases the return.
5.3 Selection on observables
Though moments of lifetime income are both academically interesting and
policy relevant of their own, it would also be good to have an indication
of how much of the differences in moments are due to selection. This is a
difficult problem even if suitable instruments for estimating causal effect of
education on mean earnings were available. Unfortunately, we do not have
reliable instuments for this sample.
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Table 7: A comparison of Mincer equations and IRRs
method education nonemployed wage growth working life income in men women
school
Mincer All Excluded 0.08 0.06
Mincer HS vs Uni Excluded 0.10 0.09
Mincer HS vs Uni Included 0.13 0.14
IRR HS vs Uni Included none 40 years None 0.14 0.15
IRR HS vs Uni Included 0.02 40 years None 0.16 0.17
IRR HS vs Uni Included 0.02 Empirical None 0.16 0.17
IRR HS vs Uni Included 0.02 Empirical Empirical 0.20 0.24
Notes: Mincer equations regress log labor income on predicted years of schooling at 10 years of predicted
experience. Internal rates of return are based on the moments of lifetime labor income for university
and vocational high school graduates in the full sample. HS indicates vocational high school, Uni
university education.
A partial remedy is that test scores from verbal, math and logical reasoning
tests administered to conscripts is available for a small number of male co-
horts. For these cohorts also information on parents’ education is available.
The length of the panel is also more limited in this subsample: earnings can
be observed for the years 1995 through 2003.
We take the 1965 cohort, for which we observe highest education at age 30
as well as incomes at ages 30 through 38. We sum these yearly incomes to
end up with a proxy of lifetime income, and take the first three moments of
the summed incomes by education.
We then repeat this exercise, but regress summed income on the three test
scores and their squares as well as on dummy variables for each level of pa-
ternal and maternal education. From this regression we take the squared and
cubed residuals and regress them in turn on the same covariates. Because we
cannot impute censored incomes in this data set, we instead censor residuals
at the 99th percentile for each level of education.
We then predict mean summed incomes by education using the first regres-
sion, holding the covariates fixed at their mean levels in the population. From
the second regression we predict the variance of summed incomes, and from
the third the skew of summed incomes. We then recombine these predicted
moments into certainty equivalent lifetime incomes like before, and scale them
relative to the certainty equivalent lifetime income for vocational high school
graduates.
The results can be seen from Table 8. Panel (a) shows the unconditional
differences in certainty equivalent lifetime income reported earlier, but this
time reported as the proportional premium over vocational education. Panel
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(b) shows the premia when we restrict our sample to the years 1995–2003.
These are close to each other.
In panels (c) and (d), we show unconditional risk premia using the method
described above; in panel (c) for the FLEED data set and in panel (d) for the
army sample. These estimates are also close to each other. The premia for
university education are likely lower than in the full FLEED sample because
this sample is observed at a younger mean age.
Panel (e) shows educational premia conditional on test scores and parental
education. As expected, these are smaller, reflecting selection into education
based on observable characteristics. Panel (f) shows how much of each pre-
mium is due to selection on observables. The mean difference between univer-
sity and vocational high school incomes is 22% smaller when holding covari-
ates constant. It is 21% smaller when looking at certainty equivalent income
using the CRRA(1) utility function, and 17% smaller using CRRA(2). A
similar proportion of income differences between vocational secondary school
graduates and compulsory school graduates can be explained away using ob-
served covariates.
These results show that while the differences in lifetime income distributions
documented in this paper are probably partially due to selection into educa-
tion, the impact of selection seems to be about equally large with or without
risk adjustments. The fact remains that income differences by education are
large in Finland, and that adjusting for risk does very little to change this.
At the very least, this calls into question the popular Finnish belief that
education is a risky investment.
6 Conclusions
Education is an investment that has a very long pay-off period. To assess
the profitability of human capital investments both their return and the risks
involved should be meausred over the entire payoff period. In practise such
evaluation requires measures of level and variation of lifetime earnings. Data
streching over entire lifetimes of indivuduals do not usually exist. However,
the moments of lifetime earnings can be estimated in a reliable way based on
much shorter panels. Panel data sapnning from ten to twenty years exist in
many countries, in particular in countries where such data can be collected
from administrative registers.
Using such data from Finland, we find large mean discounted lifetime income
differences between university graduates and vocational high school gradu-
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Table 8: Relative unconditional and conditional observed certainty equivalent
lifetime incomes for three levels of risk aversion, proportional difference to
vocational incomes. Men only.
ρ 0 1 2
(a) FLEED baseline, unconditional
compulsory -10% -13% -14%
university +116% +133% +178%
(b) FLEED 1995-2003, unconditional
compulsory -14% -20% -23%
university +119% +132% +160%
(c) FLEED 1995-2003, 1965 cohort, unconditional
compulsory -22% -27% -29%
university + 91% + 98% +106%
(d) army sample 1995-2003, 1965 cohort, unconditional
compulsory -20% -25% -27%
university +90% +100% +117%
(e) army sample 1995-2003, 1965 cohort, conditional
compulsory -15% -20% -21%
university +70% +79% +97%
(f) proportion of premium due to selection on observables = (d− e)/d
compulsory 0.25 0.20 0.22
university 0.22 0.21 0.17
ates of up to about a million euros. These differences persist in certainty
equivalent values after adjusting for the variance and skew of incomes. Mo-
ments of lifetime income are predictably smaller after taxes and transfers,
but the major part of the income difference remains.
When we compare lifetime incomes of vocational secondary graduates to the
incomes of those with compulsory school only, we find only small income dif-
ferences. After controling for employment, compulsory school graduates have
higher discounted lifetime income. This suggests that vocational secondary
education is mainly a hedge against nonemployment in Finland.
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Appendix
Undeflated standard errors
Table 9: Moments of discounted lifetime income.
men, entire sample
Compulsory Vocational HS University
mean CV skew mean CV skew mean CV skew
labor income 798 0.55 0.50 886 0.46 0.52 1914 0.52 2.59
8 0.01 0.25 9 0.01 0.43 17 0.01 0.35
disposable income 714 0.33 0.55 756 0.29 0.44 1311 0.39 2.48
4 0.01 0.33 5 0.00 0.48 8 0.01 0.32
women, entire sample
Compulsory Vocational HS University
mean CV skew mean CV skew mean CV skew
labor income 586 0.53 0.24 637 0.42 0.14 1327 0.45 1.61
6 0.01 0.11 6 0.01 0.08 11 0.01 0.37
disposable income 598 0.28 0.24 614 0.24 0.15 1005 0.31 1.59
3 0.00 0.08 3 0.00 0.07 6 0.01 0.34
men, employed or in school
Compulsory Vocational HS University
mean CV skew mean CV skew mean CV skew
labor income 1205 0.29 1.68 1193 0.28 1.53 2120 0.47 2.78
8 0.01 0.82 14 0.01 1.00 18 0.01 0.36
disposable income 878 0.23 1.60 884 0.22 1.06 1383 0.37 2.66
4 0.01 0.98 8 0.01 0.97 9 0.01 0.32
women, employed or in school
Compulsory Vocational HS University
mean CV skew mean CV skew mean CV skew
labor income 934 0.24 1.05 893 0.22 0.86 1511 0.39 2.08
6 0.01 0.51 6 0.01 0.23 14 0.01 0.39
disposable income 738 0.19 0.62 718 0.17 0.45 1076 0.29 2.12
4 0.01 0.22 4 0.00 0.14 7 0.01 0.40
Notes: Means are in ’000 EUR. The coefficient of variation CV is defined as the standard deviation
divided by the mean. The measure of skew reported is the third moment about the mean divided by
the third power of the standard deviation.
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Table 10: Certainty equivalent lifetime income, third order Taylor approxi-
mation.
men, entire sample
Compulsory Vocational HS University
relative risk aversion ρ 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
labor income 798 705 654 886 811 764 1914 1889 2121
8 11 19 9 12 22 17 28 73
difference 88 106 110 1029 1078 1357
12 16 29 19 30 76
disposable income 714 680 655 756 727 704 1311 1276 1305
4 4 6 5 5 7 8 10 18
difference 42 47 49 555 549 601
6 7 9 10 11 20
women, entire sample
Compulsory Vocational HS University
relative risk aversion ρ 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
labor income 586 515 471 637 586 547 1327 1260 1258
6 7 8 6 6 7 11 13 27
difference 51 70 76 690 674 711
9 9 10 12 15 28
disposable income 598 576 557 614 596 581 1005 973 958
3 3 4 3 3 3 6 6 8
difference 15 21 25 391 376 377
5 5 5 7 7 8
men, employed or in school
Compulsory Vocational HS University
relative risk aversion ρ 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
labor income 1205 1170 1154 1193 1160 1142 2120 2092 2285
8 10 19 14 13 20 18 26 62
difference -12 -10 -12 927 932 1143
16 17 28 23 29 65
disposable income 878 860 849 884 866 853 1383 1351 1382
4 5 9 8 7 9 9 10 18
difference 6 6 4 499 485 529
9 9 12 12 13 20
women, employed or in school
Compulsory Vocational HS University
relative risk aversion ρ 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
labor income 934 913 896 893 875 860 1511 1459 1469
6 7 8 6 6 6 14 14 24
difference -41 -38 -36 618 584 609
9 9 10 15 16 25
disposable income 738 726 716 718 709 700 1076 1050 1042
4 4 4 4 4 4 7 7 9
difference -20 -18 -16 358 341 342
6 6 6 8 8 10
Notes: Values in ’000 EUR, discounted to age 16 at δ = 0.03. Utility is CRRA(ρ). Standard errors in
italics.
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Table 11: Certainty equivalent lifetime income, second order Taylor approx-
imation.
men, entire sample
Compulsory Vocational HS University
relative risk aversion ρ 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
labor income 798 685 612 886 798 733 1914 1669 1503
8 8 9 9 9 9 17 13 15
difference 88 112 121 1029 872 770
12 12 13 19 16 18
disposable income 714 676 643 756 725 697 1311 1215 1138
4 4 5 5 5 5 8 7 7
difference 42 49 54 555 490 441
6 6 7 10 8 9
women, entire sample
Compulsory Vocational HS University
relative risk aversion ρ 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
labor income 586 509 457 637 584 542 1327 1199 1102
6 7 7 6 6 7 11 9 10
difference 51 74 85 690 615 560
9 9 10 12 11 12
disposable income 598 575 554 614 596 580 1005 957 916
3 3 4 3 3 3 6 5 5
difference 15 21 26 391 361 336
5 5 5 7 6 6
men, employed or in school
Compulsory Vocational HS University
relative risk aversion ρ 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
labor income 1205 1154 1109 1193 1147 1107 2120 1895 1731
8 7 9 14 13 13 18 14 15
difference -12 -6 -2 927 747 624
16 15 15 23 19 20
disposable income 878 855 833 884 863 844 1383 1291 1215
4 4 5 8 7 7 9 7 8
difference 6 9 11 499 427 371
9 8 9 12 10 10
women, employed or in school
Compulsory Vocational HS University
relative risk aversion ρ 0 1 2 0 1 2 0 1 2
labor income 934 908 885 893 872 853 1511 1399 1309
6 6 7 6 6 6 14 11 10
difference -41 -36 -32 618 527 456
9 9 9 15 12 12
disposable income 738 725 713 718 708 699 1076 1032 993
4 4 4 4 4 4 7 6 5
difference -20 -17 -15 358 324 295
6 6 6 8 7 7
Notes: Values in ’000 EUR, discounted to age 16 at δ = 0.03. Utility is CRRA(ρ). Standard errors in
italics.
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